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Let us imagine a young investigator who is under contract with a publisher for a volume on, say, “Politics at the End of the Renaissance.” He or she shall first delve into a mass of critical editions, translations, monographs, articles, encyclopedias as well as internet-available references. The outcome will be a seventy pages stark booklet, which shall be printed in 200 exemplars and read, say, by just as many among investigators, instructors, students, and the general public. The example above is what investigators, publishers, and readers did during the twentieth century. We are now in the twenty-first and we can do so much better. First, there shall be no unwanted dependence on paper any more. The interface device shall be entirely digitalized. Second, the information the investigator will gather will be complete, for the search engines will run through recursive series. Third, the role itself of the investigator shall lose its relevance, for instead of having one writer and 200 readers, we shall have 200 writers who shall be enabled to produce their own reconstruction of the history of the concept of cosmopolitanism. In this way, we shall have more interactive readers. And what is more, we shall have no need of having any booklet printed, for the social advantage of having 200 hundred people find out about such a relevant political category as “Politics” shall be achieved by the exercise they have managed for themselves. The leading idea is that all Europeans ought to have at least once in their lives the experience of what is a philosophical argument, i.e., an argument that is neither based on confessional or political choices, nor on material interests or whims of fashion and is nonetheless related with vitally important problems. Philosophy only makes it possible to exercise one’s reason to its full extent, which ought to be a right available to everyone. For this reason, philosophy ought to be present in all higher education curricula and students be given full freedom in selecting the argumentative strategy that fits best. Every youth ought to experience philosophy at least once in his or her lives, for this experience will give him or her meaningful orientations as regards what to do later in life. I am talking about the ability and the empathy of picking up new languages, translating, and last but not least gaining insights about one’s own cultural identity on the basis of a dialogical exchange. In fact, I am talking about re-considering the vital connection among individual psychologies and the communities they constitute (Hegel’s objective spirit) in terms of what Wilhelm Dilthey—the author of the first definition of the human sciences, nowadays a European icon—defined Wirkungszusammenhänge, namely productive systems that establish values and prefigure goals. 
In explicating his theory of world-views, Dilthey argues for a Philosophie der Philosophie that accepts no claim in isolation and no striving in its immediacy. This means that all theoretical and practical positions must be justified and related to a reflective context that allows no special discipline a final say. Disciplinary boundaries can always be questioned for the sake of a more encompassing perspective. But world-views are effective only if they bring the conceptualizing and generalizing tendencies of philosophy in relation to the concrete needs of life that find their expression in religious and cultural practices and in the arts and literature. Accordingly, Dilthey conceived his program of a critique of historical reason as the search for the life conditions that make possible the understanding of intellectual and socio-cultural developments on the basis of the situatedness of the human beings that first produced and experienced them.​[1]​ Dilthey’s approach to history is important because it relates the disciplinary search of the human sciences for valid cognition (Erkenntnis) to a more overarching quest for reflective knowledge (Wissen). 
Self-reflection frames the human sciences and provides insights into how knowledge arises from the interaction between individual and society. When studying culture, the human sciences engage not just with its present manifestations, but also with those of the past. All culture comes to us from the past. This is where history and philosophy join themselves. The social expressions of conceptual systems are rooted in language and history, while the transmission and transformation of cognitive systems is the object of study of pedagogical and educational research and of the history and philosophy of sciences. We are looking, then, at diverse traditions of the humanities. As the European Science Foundation has definitely established, the list of humanistic disciplines is hardly a static one: “Delimitations as to what constitutes the humanities vary from country to country, from research council to research council, from university to university...The future academia will be most probably defined as multi-cultural and post-disciplinary.” Trans- and interdisciplinarity and horizontal integration are thus increasingly on the agenda. Humanities research is about to redraw its boundaries while responding to external societal and political demands, as much as to internal pressure and methodological advances.​[2]​
II
The case-study I am proposing is a Renaissance interpretation of Delta 11 (1295 b 9-10) as regards the question whether “pauper presumitur nec Deum nec Iustitiam nec Honestatem curare,” posed by the Renaissance philosopher and physician Henning Arnisaeus (ca. 1575-1636) in the Doctrina politica, his celebrated commentary to Aristotle, which appeared in several editions since 1606.​[3]​
 Aristotle’s argument runs as follows: Given that measure and medietas were the best, it is evident that of the goods of fortune a possession in the middle were the best, for it makes obeying to reason much more easy, while for the ones that are excessively noble and rich or, inversely, miser, weak, or ignoble it is difficult to obey reason. Aristotle consequently identifies democracy as a perverse form of constitution because it was rule of many for many (not for all), and the many are poor, and the poor are not capable of virtue. 
Arnisaeus does not hesitate to talk about “magnum pauperies obbrobrium.” Quoting Horace, he adds pessimistically, “Quidvis & facere & pati, Virtutisque viam deserit arduam” (Oda 3, 24).​[4]​ The issue has been reconstructed in its whole history by Christopher J. Berry in his article sub voce of the New Dictionary of the History of Ideas.​[5]​ In the spirit of carrying forward philosophy by means of a critical discourse analysis, I try in this paper to re-think along Diltheyan patterns, that is, historically, world-views that today find their embodiment in texts and data that today are posted on the internet.​[6]​ In the case of Arnisaeus, the set of relations is firmly grounded in the Greek and Latin tradition. For he refers to the authors of antiquity that made sense to the question he posed:
Proptereà Scipio perinde à pauper, atque ab avaro abstinendum putabat. Vum enim Servius Sulpitius Galba & Aurelius contenderent, unter adversus Virtiatum in Hisp. Mitteretur, neutrum mitti voluit, quia, inquit, alter nihil habet, alteri nihil sati est. Ex quo Scipio. Ammir. l. 17. disc. 6. ostendit in magnis personis aequè pericolosam esse paupertatem, atquè nimias divitias, Valer. l. 6. c. 4. & merito Indi, Plin. lib. 6. cap. 19. Soli. cap. 60. Carthaginenses, Aristotl. l. 3. Polit. 9. & Romani l. Rescripto 6. in pr. de mun. & hon. l. 45. C. De Decur. lib. 10. lib. 6. De dign. C. l. 12. Ex censu & divitiis magistratum aestimarunt.​[7]​

Aristotle’s argument has indeed gone a long way, and Arnisaeus, writing at the dawn of seventeenth century, i.e., at the beginning of the long story of Europe’s national conflicts, has played a role in it. Especially, Arnisaeus catches the feelings of the bourgeois to be, as it is masterly represented in a long line that spans from the eulogy of medietas in the opening lines of Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe to the utterly explicit lamentations in twentieth-century literature of the anti-rousseauian paradox according to which gross inequality makes the poor corrupt the rich. 
III
Every epoch poses its own problems, and every author finds a particular position of problems as given. The history of the problems (Problemgeschichte) is a discipline concerned with the tradition of a given problem and with the particular ways it has been transmitted to a certain author of philosophical writings. I am convinced that nowadays, thanks to the electronic processing of texts and of library catalogues, it is possible to open up new fields of research by leaving for a moment aside the usual image we have of seventeenth-centuries philosophers as a reader of ancient, medieval, and Renaissance philosophers, with whom they feel connected by spiritual ties, and rather concentrate our attention on the less usual images of philosophers as students attending courses and studying textbooks, particularly textbooks originated within the Aristotelian tradition, and as teachers eager to find their place within longstanding philosophical traditions. 
The problem of the poor has indeed always been “one of a threat of the social order and thus always had a political dimension.”​[8]​ Arnisaeus provides us with the missing link between Aristotle and Kant. Kant came close to prefigure the duty of the state to support the poor because of the right to “the means of preservation (die Mittel der Erhaltung)” stated in Kant’s Rechtslehre.​[9]​ In fact, the institution of property rights can lead to the situation whereby, there being nothing left to appropriate, persons could become dependent upon others for their very existence, the validity of property rights (and private rights in general) in the civil condition depends upon the state’s supporting the poor so as to ensure that such relations of dependence do not arise.​[10]​
That the impact of Arnisaeus was a conspicuous phenomenon up to the middle of the eighteenth century is well known to the scholars of Aristotelianism, but is still hardly known to Kant-scholars. As a matter of fact, the problem of finding Aristotle’s or Arnisaeus’ traces in Kant’s political philosophy will be always open, and it will ever be, because one cannot speak of sources, but rather of traces. Contrarily to Rousseau, and Hegel, Kant never engaged himself in direct reading of any Aristotelian texts.​[11]​ His Greek was very poor. He actually never seem to have read anything by Arnisaeus either. Having read his Latin writings, however, we also know that his Latin was not poor. So, why did he not read the Latin Aristotle or Arnisaeus? Apparently he was repelled by the idea of opening large volumes. In Reflexion 3476 (dated by Adickes to the phases lamda-ro, i.e., anytime from 1776 to 1798) Kant pinpoints his feelings about books quite Socratically by means of a Greek aphorism, “a great book is a great evil (mega biblíon mega kakón),” which he lets immediately follow by another one, also Socratic, in German, “Great bone-house: library (Großes Beinhaus: Bibliothek).”​[12]​ Statements of this tenor induce to give up the thought of Kant as a reader of Aristotle. However, there is still the possibility of looking for traces. The procedure I have in mind consists in interpreting a significant problematic context in Kant while hammering it down with questions which had been proposed and resolved by Arnisaeus.
Under this point of view, historians of philosophy shall begin considering the issue of Politica as a continuous transposition of texts as well as images and performances insofar they are in some relations to texts. They shall look into traditions consisting of re-writings, translations, interpretations, and metamorphosis. They shall not attempt at providing any privileged approach, for the forms of cultural exchange through the centuries are manifold (think only of the transposition of myths and images or of figurative and architectural models). They shall try instead to reconstruct some crucial moments of the translation of written texts from the one to the other geographic, political, and linguistic context within the horizon and the limits of the formation of European cultures, in respect to which the translationes have often been the cause of crisis and palingenesis.​[13]​ The history of ideas strives towards interacting with the history of language and the history of concepts, and the controversial units are indeed historically dynamic items. Controversy is a ubiquitous phenomenon in human theoretical and practical life. It manifests itself in various forms, ranging from virulent polemics to polite and well-ordered discussion. It may make use of invective, subtle rhetorical persuasion, or logical argumentation—or a combination of all of these. It may express or lead to irreconcilable conflict or pave the way to conflict resolution. It occurs in private and everyday social life, in the courtroom and in politics, as well as in science, the arts, philosophy, and theology. Wherever it occurs, controversy sharpens critical thinking and prevents mental and social stagnation. It is the engine of progress.​[14]​
IV
With respect to the genre of the Politica as a whole, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, I wish to point out alongside with Dilthey the interdisciplinarity and multiculturality of philosophical texts that constitute the common cultural foundation that lies at the origin of Europe’s pluralism from Antiquity to our days. Philosophers consider periods within the history of development of all sciences by focusing on the discussions about their methodologies. At stake is the characteristically European ability of coming to terms with ambiguities, in the effort of productively acquiring diversity of both internal and external origin. Philosophy facilitates creative thinking in as far as it provides its students and scholars with methods and contents for both plastic and differentiated expression and for enriching logical arguments by metaphors and iconic references. These questions have been raised already by Rémi Brague and concern, then, the eccentric identity of Europe as well as that of many other cultures.​[15]​
We are looking into the capability of confronting one’s own tradition with the tradition of one’s neighbor, alongside of what has been known as a continuing translatio studiorum, which is the cultural melting pot already spoken about by Plato in the Timaeus (23c) with regard to the translation of the art of writing from Atlantic to Egypt and from Egypt to Greece, thus prefiguring the translation of Greek words, culture and thoughts into Cicero’s and Boethius’ Latin words, or the dynamics of the great Mediterranean cultural circle made of translation and tradition of philosophical, religious and medical texts from Greek an Hebrew into Arabic, Latin and all vernacular languages of Europe. A new approach to the history of concepts is needed that considers the development of disciplinary lexica, which arise from the necessity of maintaining a cultural tradition’s continuity in front of the need of transcribing it into new contexts. When Boethius—as Tullio Gregory has made it clear—set himself to translate Aristotle into Latin in the sixth century, he was motivated to do so in order, first, to keep alive the Latin classical tradition and, second, to modernize it by being transcribed into the new contexts opened up by the paradigmatic acceptance of Aristotelianism. When Kant chose to re-propose Greek terms such as phenomenon and noumenon he did it for he wished, first, to keep up the tradition of writing on Philosophy in German, a tradition that had its classical references in Master Eckhart and Martin Luther, and second, to revitalize it by transcribing it into the new context of the his own Copernican Revolution.​[16]​ 
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